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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Utah Code Ann, Sec. 78-2-2(3) (a)

(Supp. 1988)

grants the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over judgments of the Court of Appeals.

This Court granted a peti-

tion for writ of certiorari in this case on August 31, 1989,
based on the statutory authority of Utah Code Ann. Sec.
78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1988).

The matter was originally appealed

to the Utah Supreme Court in case no*

870064 from an order

of the Third Judicial District Courts Salt Lake County, the
Honorable John A. Rokich presiding.

By an Order of Trans-

fer, the Utah Supreme Court referred the matter to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial

court, which decision was entered on December 23, 1988. The
Court of Appeals1 Order Denying Rehearing was entered on
January 26, 1989.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Has the Court of Appeals departed from the

accepted course of judicial proceedings or departed from a
lower court as to call for an exercise of this Court's power
and supervision.
2.

Whether or not three 3" x 5" cards contain the

signature of the decedent, Robert E. Erickson, and if such
writing is his signature whether or not such signature was
placed on the cards to authenticate them as his Last Will
and Testament for attestation purposes.
3.

If the cards themselves constitute the Last

Will and Testament of Robert E. Erickson.
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REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
The Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this
matter is reported in Estate of Erickson v. Misaka 766 P.2d
1085 (Utah App. 1988) and 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct. App.
Dec. 23, 1988) Sec. 78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp. 1988).
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Utah Code. Ann. Sec. 75-2-503 Holographic Will.
A will which does not comply with Sec. 75-2-502
is valid as a holographic will, whether or not
witnessed, if the signature and the material
provisions are in the handwriting of the testator.
If there are several holographic wills in
existence with conflicting provisions, the
holographic will which is established by date or
other circumstances to be the Will that was last
executed shall control. If it is impossible to
determine which Will was last executed, the
consistent provisions of the several Wills shall
be considered valid and the inconsistent
provisions shall be considered invalid.
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 68-3-12 (2) (r). Rules of
Construction.
(2) In the construction of these statutes, the
following definitions shall be observed, unless
the definition would be inconsistent with the
manifest intent of the Legislature, or repugnant
to the context of the statute:
(r) "Signature" includes any name, mark, or
sign written with the intent to authenticate any
instrument or writing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action based on the Petition of Tatsumi
Misaka, requesting the admission of three 3" x 5" cards as
the holographic will of Robert E. Erickson.

The Personal

Representative of the Estate of Robert E. Erickson opposed
the admission of the cards as the holographic will of Robert
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E. Erickson.

The cards were admitted to Probate by the

trial court, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding.

The

matter was originally appealed to the Utah Supreme Court in
case no. 870064 with this court transferring the matter for
determination by the Court of Appeals on February 25, 1988.
On appeal the Utah State Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court finding that the trial court had improperly admitted
the cards as the holographic will of Robert E. Erickson.
Statement of the Facts
Robert E. Erickson died in an automobile accident
on June 16, 1983.

At the time of his death, his known heirs

were his wife Dorothy Jean Erickson, his son Robert Erickson,
Jr., and a daughter Sheryl Swaner (R-14).

The Last Will and

Testament of Robert E. Erickson dated June 9, 1955 (R-19-22)
was admitted to Probate with First Interstate Bank of Utah,
N.A. as the Personal Representative, on July 27, 1983
(R-24).

On October 11, 1985, Tatsumi Misaka filed a Petition

to probate three 3M x 5" cards as the holographic will of
Robert E. Erickson (R-70).

(Copies of the cards are at R-33

& 74 with originals at 3-P on Exhibits).

The Personal

Representative of the Estate of Robert E. Erickson moved to
dismiss the Petition of Tatsumi Misaka on the grounds that
the documents failed to meet the requirements of a valid
holographic will and further that the documents were incapable of being probated (R-82-83).
At trial, the Petitioner, through an expert,
presented testimony that the cards were written by Robert E.
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Erickson (R-143) and were prepared sometime within a four to
six month time period (R-146).

No testimony was presented

that there was any testamentary intent on behalf of the
decedent to have the cards be his Will, or that the name
contained on one card was in fact the signature, not just a
written name, of the decedent.

The Personal Representative

moved at the close of the Petitioner's evidence to dismiss
the Petition for failure to meet its burden of proof, which
Motion was denied by the Court*
The Personal Representative submitted evidence at
trial that:
1.

The writing contained on the three unattached

separate cards were written in two different inks* (3-P)
2.

Only one card contained the date of August 27,

1973. (3-P)
3.

The documents make only a partial distribution

of the real and personal properties of the decedent which
were owned when the cards were supposedly prepared. (R-135,
154-155)
4.

The decedent had the knowledge and had on

occasion prepared formal Wills for friends and relatives
prior to and after the date of August 27, 1973, and had in
fact prepared such within one and a half months of these
cards. (R-152, 4-d)
5.

The name of the decedent as contained on one

card was in fact not the signature of the decedent (there
being a difference between how the decedent would write his
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name rather than sign his name).

(Note:

The court reporter

left a space at line 15-R-156 which should read A. "No. 1,
his name is not his signature."

See affidavit of Sheryl

Swaner which is attached hereto as Appendix A.)
6.

The cards were not numbered. (3-P)

7.

The cards would only have been written when

the decedent was under the influence of alcohol. (R-156)
8.

In the documents there were numerous abbrevia-

tions such as FH Store, REEJ, Sheryl, T.T. Matoka, T.
Misaka, Dorothy and Bobby, without explanation as to who
these items or people are or were. (3-P)
Based upon the above and lack of evidence on other
items that had not been proven or shown at trial, the
Personal Representative submitted Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order for the Court's signature which
items were rejected by the Court (R-112-119).

The Court

thereafter accepted the Order (R-120) and Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law as submitted by the Petitioner and
admitted the cards to Probate as the holographic will of
Robert E. Erickson. (R-122-125).
The Court of Appeals in its decision agreed with
the position of the Personal Representative that the Petitioner , Tatsumi Misaka, had not met his burden of proof.
The decision of the Appeals Court was based upon the lack of
evidence presented by the petitioner and the nature of the
cards themselves where the Appeals Court stated:
"Our review of the purported holographic will in
this case leads us to conclude that it does not
-5-

contain the signature required by the statute
before it can be admitted to probate.
The three cards in evidence are index cards on
which only the unlined sides have been written*
They were not attached to each other. There is no
concluding language on any of the cards, and they
otherwise give no indication that they are, taken
together, a completed document. Indeed, the
nature of the note cards, the use of abbreviations, lack of punctuation, and the perfunctory,
open-ended wording strongly suggest that the
cards, as a documents, are unfinished or
constitute a draft.
Although the handwritten name of the decedent
appears in the phrase "I Robert E. Erickson do
hereby state," the writing contains nothing
indicating the name was intended as the required
executing signature. There is nothing on the face
of the cards to affirmatively or by necessary
implication suggest that decedent wrote his name
for any other purpose than to identify himself as
the writer. See In re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal.
36, 239 P. 404 (1925); see generally, Annotation,
Place of Signature of Holographic Wills, 19 A.L.R.
2d 926, 933-44 (1951). In short, there is no
evidence that decedent's name was written in the
introductory clause on one card with the intent
that it constitute authentication of one or all of
the cards as a will. Respondent, therefore,
failed to make a prima facie showing that the
purported holographic will contained the
authenticating signature required by Sec.75-2-503.
It is, of course possible for a handwritten name
at the beginning of the body of a will to be
written with the intent that it be the requisite
signature. However, there must be support in the
evidence for that intent. Standing alone, it is
equivocal, leaving the decedent's final approval
and authentication of the writing in doubt.
Without more, it is an inadequate guard against
writing being deleted, a possibility in this case
if additional cards were written upon by Erickson
only to be lost, misplaced, or discarded by him or
others". (766 P.2d 1085, 1088)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT

I

The Utah Court of Appeals in reviewing the testimony and evidence as presented by Tatsumi Misaka correctly
determined that Tatsum Misaka had failed to meet his burden
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of proof in establishing that the documents were in fact the
holographic will of Robert E. Erickson.

The Court of

Appeals did not depart or render an inappropriate decision
nor did it abuse its discretion.

The Court of appeals

decision should remain intact, unaffected by this Court.
POINT II
The three 3" x 5" cards were never intended by the
decedent, Robert E. Erickson, to be his last will and
testament.

The cards at most were notes.

The name of

Robert E. Erickson as it existed on one of the cards was not
the signature of Robert E. Erickson for attestation purposes.
The decedent had the knowledge and expertise to prepare
formal wills and knew the requirement of properly executed
wills.
POINT

III

The three 3" x 5" cards are ambiguous and give no
clear meaning as to the disposal of the decedent's estate.
Names are misspelled and/or abbreviated and it would require
speculation as to who the individuals or property is and to
whom it should be given.

The cards do not dispose of all of

the decedent's property.

The cards are impossible to be

administered by the Personal Representative.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE DECISION BY THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
SHOULD STAND UNAFFECTED BY THIS COURT.
The presumption of a proper decision by the
Appeals Court rests with the Respondent.
bear the burden of demonstrating error.
-7-

The Appellant must
See Litho Sales,

Inc. v, Cutrubus, 636 P.2d 487 (Utah 1981).

Absent a

showing that the Appeals Court acted in excess of its
authority or in a manner so clearly outside reason that its
ruling is deemed capricious and arbitrary, its decision must
stand. See Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976).

The Appeals Court must

clearly have abused its discretion before this court should
reverse that court's decision.

Rule 43(3) Rules of the

Supreme Court requires for a review of the Appeal Court
decision that:
"The Court of Appeals has rendered its decision
that has so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far
sanctioned such and departed from a lower court as
to call for an exercise of this Court's power and
supervision."
The Court of Appeals decision has no

"departure

from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings"
as to required this court's intervention. The Court of
Appeals decision must be shown to be clearly erroneous
before this court should substitute its decision for that of
the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the testimony as
presented by the Petitioner, Tatsumi Misaka, at trial and
found that the Petitioner's entire case consisted of three
3" x 5" index cards which were unattached and found loosely
in a drawer, that the cards were written in the handwriting
of the decedent, Robert E. Erickson, and that the cards were
prepared somewhere in a four to six month period.

There was

no showing whatsoever by the Appellant that there was any
-8-

intent by the testator that the card$ be his Last Will and
Testament, nor was there any evidence to indicate that the
name contained in the body of the Will was in fact the
signature for authenticating purpose^.
The Personal Representative! in its case in chief
presented at the trial court that the name of Robert E.
Erickson as contained in the body of the document was not
his signature.

(See Appendix A. Affidavit of Sheryl Swaner)

This statement was never refuted, nor contradicted by the
Appellant.

The Utah Court of Appeals in its decision noted

that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 68-3-12(2)(r) (1988)
"... A decedent's handwritten name in the body of
the proported holographic will is not, by itself,
prima facie evidence that tjie document contains
the decedent's signature, ^n the context of
Sec. 75-2-503, such a handwritten name must have
been written with the intent that it operates as
an authentication of the document as a Will in
order for it to be a signature. The purpose of
our statutory scheme is to require a course of
conduct which assures that $ person's Will is
reduced to writing, and when handwritten, that the
intention to have the writing take legal effect be
indicated by a signature which records that fact.
The signature requirement slfiows that the writer
finally approved the writing and meant for it to
be operative as a testamentary instrument. See
Mechem, the Rule in Lemayne v. Stanley, 29 Mich.
L. Rev. 685, 690-96 (1931).* Estate of Erickson,
766 P.2d 1085, 1088.
The name as contained in th^ cards in this case
was not the signature of the decedent for attestation
purposes.

The Appellant never presented any evidence that

the name contained therein was the signature of the decedent
for authentication purposes and thus it properly reversed
the trial court.

The Utah State CourtL of Appeals had made a
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determination that the Appellant "failed to make a prima
facie showing that the purported holographic will contained
the authenticating signature required by Sec. 75-2-503"•
(Estate of Erickson, 766 P.2d 1085-1088)

Based on such, the

findings of the Appeal Court should be sustained.
Additionally, the Appellant sets forth in its
brief the issue that the signature of the decedent for
attesting purposes was not raised at trial or on appeal.
This statement as made by the Appellant is incorrect.

The

testimony of Sheryl Swaner at trial was that the name as
contained on one of the cards was not the signature of the
decedent and the case of In re Bloch's Estate, 39 Cal. 2d
570, 248 P.2d 21 (1952), was cited to the court for the
specific purpose that the signature in the body of the
document must be placed there with the intent to authenticate the document.
The argument as presented by the Personal Representative requested the Court examine the cards and from
those cards make a determination that there was no intent
that the name as contained therein was the signature, and
that the cards were at most, possible notes.

The position

taken at trial and the position taken in the brief has
always remained the same for the Personal Representative and
those items were in fact addressed at the trial level and in
front of the Appellate Court.
The Appellant argues that if the Court of Appeals
decision is allowed to stand that it will significantly
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prohibit a layman from preparing and|/or using a holographic
will for testamentary purposes.

Such a conclusion is

incorrect because the decision actually helps a layman in
preparing and using a holographic wijl.

The Appeals Court

has set forth that the name in a body of a document, so long
as it is done with intent to authenticate the document, will
make for a valid testamentary disposition of the decedent's
property.

Notes and drafts which are not meant to be testa-

mentary dispositions of property will not be admitted to
probate to allow wrongful distribution of a decedent's
estate under the Court of Appeals decision.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO TESTAMENTARY INDENT TO HAVE THE
CARDS MADE AS THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE
DECEDENT.
The evidence presented by the Petitioner at trial
was that the cards were written by Robert E. Erickson,
sometime within a four to six month period of August 27,
1973.

After the presentation of this evidence, the Peti-

tioner rested its case.

The Petitioner stated to the Court

that the decedent was a layman and not familiar with the
terms and requirements of preparing a formal Will, and thus
to require that his signature appear either at the end to
signify a completed document was therefore unnecessary and
that the name as contained in the body of the cards should
be intended to be the attesting signature of Robert E.
Erickson to declare the cards to be his holographic will.
The Exhibits as furnished to the Court (4-d), the Will of
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the decedent as submitted to Probate, (R-19-22) and the
testimony of Sheryl Swaner, the daughter of the decedent,
that the decedent had prepared Wills for an uncle, grandfather, and her stepmother's mother, (R-153) set forth that
the decedent in this matter had the knowledge of the formal
will requirements which existed at the time that the purported holographic will was supposedly prepared.

In deter-

mining whether it was the intent of the decedent to have the
cards as his holographic will, the Court may look at his
knowledge and the requirements to which the decedent is
aware at the time that the documents are prepared in determining whether or not his intent existed to have the documents determined to be his Last Will and Testament.

(See In

re Hughes1 Estate 140 Cal. App. 97, 35 P.2d 204 (1934)).

In

the matter at hand the decedent was extremely familiar with
the requirements of a Will and the formalities which were
required in the preparation of such a Will.

The cards set

forth that the document is the "Last Will and Test", not
Testament of the decedent.
previous Wills.

The documents do not revoke any

The documents have numerous abbreviations

as to persons and entities.

The cards are an incomplete

disbursal of the real and personal properties owned by the
decedent, and there is no residual clause in regards to
other items or property which were known to be owned by the
decedent at the time these documents were prepared.

There

is no signature at the end of the cards to signify completeness or termination of the transfer of property.
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All of

these particular items were within the knowledge of the
decedent and he failed to place them into these cards when
he knew that there were formal requirements for these
particular items.

The decedent did r^ot make these documents

complete when he knew that completeness was necessary to
have a proper testamentary disposition of his property.
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 75-2-503 (1953 as amended)
sets forth as follows:
"A will which does not comply with section
75-2-502 is valid as a holographic will, whether
or not witnessed, if the signature and the
material provisions are in the handwriting of the
testator.. ."
The name of the decedent is in the body of one card. Utah
Law is unclear as to whether or not the signature must
appear at the end of the document and the case law in this
particular matter, as to where the signature needs to be
placed, is split among the various jurisdictions throughout
the United States.

See generally, Annotation, Place of

Signature of Holographic Wills, 19 A.L.R.2d 926 (1951).

In

the case at hand it would be better to have had, and required,
that the signature be at the end of the documents so that
there can be known by all concerned that the documents are
finished and complete.

As noted hereijn, there were consider-

able assets which remain unmentioned, and no additional
cards are known at this time. The better rule of law would
be that the signature needs to be at the end of a document
so that all parties notice that the decedent had completed
the document and desires to take no further action as to his
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property and assets.

In In re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal.

36, 239 P. 404 (1925), the California Court held that though
the name of the decedent was in the opening clause of a
holographic will, such was not his signature for attesting
purposes when it was clear that there was additional information which the writer had intended to place in the document.

When the document is not complete on its face, then

the signature or name of a decedent may not be in the
document for other than identification purposes and not for
the purpose of attestation.
In the jurisdictions which have allowed the
document to be signed in any part of the document, the
Courts have been universal in their requirements that 1) the
writing must be the signature of the decedent, with his
intent that it be such, and 2) that the signature as placed
in the documents, though not at the end, is done to attest
to the document and declare it to be the Last Will and
Testament of the decedent.

(See 19 A.L.R.2d 926)

The

testimony at trial, from Sheryl Swaner, was that the name as
contained in the body of the document is not his signature.
(See Statements of Facts and Affidavit of Sheryl Swaner as
attached hereto.)

Testimony as presented by the Petitioner

was that the document was written by the same person but
this does not necessarily mean that the writing is the same
as the persons signature.

Sheryl Swaner was also questioned

as to whether or not the name contained in the documents was
such to be an attestation to be the declaration of
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intentions of the decedent.
QUESTION:

Sheryl $waner states as follows:

"Ma'am do you have an opinion as to

whether or not this was your father's intentions or whether
or not these were notes that he had written to himself?"
ANSWER:
had written.

"I believe that they were notes that he

I do not believe they Were his intentions,

no."
QUESTION:
ANSWER:

"What do you base that upon?"
"Well I base it upon the fact that he

would write those to himself at night when he had been
drinking and that's

all of the things were not in there

that he owned at the time. It's incomplete." (R-158-159)
When examining all these factors as they relate
herein, it must be determined whether or not the name of the
testator appearing in the holographic'will constitutes an
authenticating signature.

In the case of In re Manchester's

Estate, 174 Cal. 417, 163 P. 358 (1917), the California
Court stated:
"The true rule, as we conceive it to be, is that,
wherever placed, the fact that is was intended as
an executing signature must satisfactorily appear
on the face of the document itself. If it is at
the end of the document, thi universal custom of
mankind forces the conclusion that it was appended
as an execution, if nothing to the contrary
appears. If placed elsewhere, it is for the Court
to say, from an inspection of the whole document,
its language as well as its form, and the relative
position of its parts, whether or not there is a
positive and satisfactory inference from the
document itself that the signature was so placed
with the intent that it should there serve as a
token of execution. If such inference thus
appears, the execution may be considered as proven
by such signature." (at 163 P. 358, 360)
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At the time that the purported document was
prepared, it was the decedent's custom to write notes to
himself from which he would prepare formal documents on
items upon which he intended to act. (R-155-156)
Further, when looking at the cards themselves, the
cards contain abbreviations such as "Test" for supposed
testament, FH Store, Dorothy, REEJ, Sheryl, T Misaka, T.T.
Matoka, and Bobby, all indicating possible notes to oneself,
not a testamentary disposition of property.

The cards

themselves do not revoke any prior Wills, though in the
documents as presented to Court from the previous Wills,
specifically show that the decedent had the knowledge to
require the revocation of prior Wills.

Further, the dece-

dent would only prepare such cards while under the influence
of alcohol. (R-156)

When drinking, the decedent's hand-

writing would change as in the case herein were it starts
small and gets larger.

Additionally, the decedent was a

good speller except while under the influence of alcohol and
the documents as presented herein have numerous spelling
errors as well as the abbreviations as previously noted.
The cards contain no residual clause for the remainder of
the decedent's estate.

At the time of the preparation of

the documents, the decedent held numerous other items of
real and personal property which included three Drug Stores
(Foothill, Cottonwood, and Stratford Avenue in Sugarhouse),
real property on Mount Olympus, Salt Lake City, Utah, real
property in Hawaii, apartment buildings on Main Street, a
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car shop, a car dealership, mutual fulnds and bank accounts.
(R 154-155)

Nowhere in these documents is there any mention

of these properties.

In determining whether there is a

testamentary disposition, the Courts have looked at whether
or not the document is a complete testamentary disposition
of the property. See In re Bernard's ftstate, 197 Cal. 36, 239
P. 404 (1925); In re Leonard's Estate, 1 Cal. 2d 8, 32 P.2d
603 (1926); In re Devlin's Estate, 19$ Cal. 721, 247 P. 577
(1926); In re Hurley's Estate, 178 Cal. 713, 174 P. 669
(1918); also descent of Justice Traynbr, In re Bloch's
Estate, 238 P.2d 21 (1952).
The decedent was a "pack rat" and had kept everything from 1940 to the present (R-158).

The cards are at

best notes of the decedent's possible ideas for making a
Will in the future but not notes such as these where his
intentions to be his testamentary disposition of his property.

It was the decedent's practice of preparing type

written documents for his affairs upoh which he intended to
act from the note cards. (R-155-156)

The decedent had

written notes down on cards upon which he never intended to
act but never took the time to throw such cards away. When
all of this is coupled with his knowledge of Wills and the
requirements which existed at the time for those Wills
including the placement of the name, Robert E. Erickson, the
lack of residual clauses, the lack of addressing numerous
items which he possessed at the time, abbreviations of items
and persons, spelling problems, and his inebriation all set
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forth that the name as set forth in the body of the cards is
the written name of the decedent and not his signature with
the intent to authenticate these cards as his Last Will and
Testament*
The Utah Supreme Court partially addressed the
question of a signature in the case of In re Yowell's
Estate, 75 Utah 312, 285 P. 285 (1930), at P. 295, wherein
the court noted that the purported holographic will was
"ending with and including the signature" of the decedent.
When a document ends with a signature it can be stated with
reasonable certainty that the document is complete.

In this

action there is no certainty which exists to say that the
decedent ever intended these cards to be his testamentary
disposition of his estate. The cards are not the holographic
will of the decedent.
POINT

III

THE NATURE OF THE CARDS THEMSELVES FAIL TO
ESTABLISH A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
PROPERTY OF THE DECEDENT.
The cards content, disposition of property and the
extent of property mentioned in the cards establish that the
cards cannot be a holographic will.

The cards themselves

were unattached and only from reading the cards could any
sense of "joiner" be determined.

There is no knowledge of

any party if additional cards exist and based upon the fact
that there are so many items of real and personal property
which were owned by the decedent at the time of his death to
which there was no disposition of those particular items, it
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can be readily stated that either this is not a holographic
will but merely notes, or that there might possibly be
additional cards which would dispose of such property but
which have never been discovered.

(Note: At a previous

hearing on a Motion to Dismiss, the Affidavit of Rod Cushing
sets forth that the Affiant and all the heirs of the above
Estate are without knowledge as to whether or not there are
additional cards or papers for the documents in relation to
the cards filed hereto. See R-84)

The cards are written in

two different inks with the dating in a different color from
the beginning of the cards. No one knows when the cards
were prepared or even if they were prepared at the same
time.

The best that can be said of the cards is that they

were all prepared within a four to si^ month period. (R-146)
The Utah Supreme Court in In re Love's Estate, 75 Utah 342,
285 P. 299 (1930), has held that it is not necessary that
the sheets be fastened together by some mechanical device,
as long as under the facts of each casle there is a coherent
running of the testamentary disposition of the property.

In

the case presently before this Court there is a lack of a
finished document dealing with the property and assets of
the decedent, thus even if there is a Coherency by reading
the documents, there is an incompleteness as to the documents because the documents are unfinished.
There is also a problem as to who receives the
property.

The decedents abbreviations of persons and

property make it unclear as to which individual or property
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he was discussing.

The Estate is not nor should it be

required to speculate upon the names of the parties in the
cards, especially since there are different spellings for
names and uncertainties as to whether they refer to different people.
There is a further public policy reason to deny
the admission of the documents to probate and that is that
the Estate should not be awarded such that part of the
Estate goes by testamentary disposition and the remainder
goes by another document and/or intestate succession.

If

the Court were to adopt a document as submitted by the
Petitioner herein, it would require the Estate divide the
assets and Estate of the decedent pursuant to the three
3" x 5" cards and speculate as to the intent of the decedent
as to how he desired to have the remaining assets distributed.
It would then need to be determined as to whether or not the
assets would pass by the first Will as first received by the
Court to be probated (R-19-22), when no act of revocation
took place as required in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 75-2-507, or
by intestate succession.

Further, a Will needs to be

construed to pass all property which the testator owned at
his death including property acquired after the execution of
the Will.

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 75-2-604 (1953 as amended).
In this action, the documents are so incomplete

requiring speculation and conjecture to take place by the
Personal Representative as to what the testator's intentions
were, that the document fails to be a holographic will of
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the decedent.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals in reviewing the transcript
and the evidence presented at trial properly found that the
Appellant had failed to meet his burden of proof.

The

Appeals Court thus properly reversed the trial court. The
decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
The name of the decedent as contained in the one
card is placed in the card for identification purposes only.
The name of the decedent was not placed in the card for
attestation purposes or to authenticate the three unattached
cards to be his Last Will and Testament.

The decedent had

the knowledge and the expertise to prepare formal Wills and
knew the requirements of properly executed Wills.

It was

not the intent of the decedent to have the three cards be
his holographic will.

Additionally, the cards themselves

are incapable of being probated.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of
February, 1990.

Attorn
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Robert E. Erickson
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RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011
Attorney for Respondent
311 South State Street, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 841111
Telephone (801) 531-1300
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate
of ROBERT E. ERICKSON,
Deceased,
Supreme Court No. 890110
Respondent,
vs.

Court of Appeals
No. 880138-CA

TATSUMI MISAKA,
Petitioner.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT four (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of the Respondent, together
with a copy of this Certificate of Service was hand
delivered upon Herschel J. Saperstein/Ken P. Jones, of
Watkiss & Campbell, Attorneys for Appellant, 310 S. Main,
Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84;
February, 1990.
R
Attorne'

Respondent
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RANDY S. LUDLOW #2011
Attorney for Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Robert E. Erickson
311 S. State, Suite 280
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-1300
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ) AFFIDAVIT OF SHERYL SWANER
)

ROBERT E. ERICKSON,

) District Court No. P83-583
) Supreme Court No. 870064
)

Deceased.
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Comes now Sheryl Swaner, who being first duly
sworn states as follows:
1.

That the Affiant is the daughter of the

Decedent, Robert E. Erickson.
2.

That at the time that the trial was held in

this matter, the statement as made by the Affiant at trial
as set forth on page 28 of the transcript at line 15 should
state as follows:
ANSWER NO. 1:

His name is not his signature

writing is kind of different...
That the Affiant knows of her own knowledge that
she had stated to the Court that the name as contained in
the three 3M x 5" cards was not in fact the signature of her

APPENDIX A

father, and that it should have been contained at line 15
page 28 of the transcript of the trial# (R-156 L15)
FURTHER the Affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this / f day of May, 1987.
si

Sheryl/Swaner
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of

May, 1987,

NcKary Publi^, ^sTSiQ^a_t
Salt-Lake Couhty, Utah
My Commission Expires:

T-rr-fO
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APPENDIX B
ESTATE OF ERI KSON v. MISAKA
Cite a* 766 ?2d

fees in connection with the enforcement of
Stacey's rights under the note Since Stacy's attempt to accelerate the note was
unsuccessful, Stacey was properly denied
its attorney fees.
[6] In regards to Golwix's claim for attorney fees, the trial court found that it
Was "not entitled to an award of fees because [it] did not prevail on many of [its]
counterclaims." The letter agreement provides, however, for the reimbursement of
Golwix's attorney fees incurred in enforcing any claims for breach of warranty or
failure of performance. The contractual
provision is expansively written, encompassing a broad range of potential expenses connected with rights arising under
the contract The mere fact that Golwix
failed to prevail on some of their counterclaims does not justify a withholding of
fees to which they were contractually entitled. "Provisions in written contracts providing for payment of attorney fees should
ordinarily be honored by the courts."
Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Utah
1983). Golwix was not only successful in
its opposition to acceleration of the note, it
was also successful on some of its counterclaims. Therefore, even with partial success, Golwix was entitled to attorney fees
for the claims on which it was successful.
See Trayner, 688 P.2d at 858 (each party
was entitled to attorney fees where each
was partially successful). We conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to give effect to the broad contractual language and partial success of Golwix
in enforcing its contractual rights.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed
in part and reversed in part The case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs are awarded
to Golwix.
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
fc f «Y»UMMISY*TIM>
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In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Robert
E. ERICKSON, Deceased, Appellant
•.

TaUumi MISAKA, Respondent.
No. 880139-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 23, 1988.
A petition for probate of three handwritten three-inch by five-inch cards as decedent's holographic will was filed. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
John A. Rokich, J., admitted the cards to
probate, and personal representative appealed. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J.,
held that there was no evidence that decedent's name was written in the introductory clause on one card with the intent that it
constitute authentication of one or all of
the cards as a will.
Final judgment and order vacated.
1. Wills *=>133
Decedent's intent is crucial factor in
determining whether purported holographic will has been signed within meaning of
statute pertaining to execution of wills.
U.C.A.1953, 75-2-503.
2. Wills *=>130, 131
Although statutory requirements for
execution of valid holographic wills are
minimal, statute is mandatory and not directory; holographic document is invalid as
will-despite deceased's clear intent that document will be will-unless document complies with governing statute. U.C.A.1953,
75-2-503.
3. Wills *»133
Decedent's handwritten name in body
of purported holographic will is not, by
itself, prima facie evidence that document
contains decedent's signature; handwritten
name must have been written with intent
that it operate as authentication of document as will in order for it to be signature. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-12(2Xr), 75-2-503.
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4. Wills $=>133

Three handwritten three-inch by fiveinch cards were inadmissible as holograph
will despite fact that decedent's name was
written in introductory clause on one card;
there was no evidence that decedent's
name was written with intent that it constitute authentication of one or all of cards as
will. U.C.A.1953, 75-2-503.
5. Wills <3=*133

It is possible for handwritten name at
beginning of body of will to be written with
intent that it be requisite signature, but
there must be support in evidence for that
intent.
Randy S. Ludlow (argued), Salt Lake
City, for appellant.
Herschell J. Saperstein, Ken P. Jones
(argued), Watkiss and Campbell, Salt Lake
City, for respondent.
Before GARFF, BILLINGS and
JACKSON, JJ.
JACKSON, Judge:
Robert E. Erickson died in June 1983.
His formal will, executed June 9, 1955, was
admitted to probate in July 1983 and the
designated personal representative appointed. In October 1985, respondent Tatsumi
Misaka filed a petition for probate of three
handwritten 3 ' x 5 ' cards as Erickson's
holographic will. In this appeal, the personal representative challenges the trial
court's admission of the cards to probate.
Because we conclude there is insufficient
evidence that Erickson intended his handwritten name on one of the cards to be his
signature for purposes of Utah Code Ann.
§ 7&-2-503 (1978), we vacate the final order and judgment below.

In re WolcotVs Estate, 54 Utah 165,180 P.
169 (1919). The introductory Editorial
Board Comment to Part 5 of the Utah
Uniform Probate Code,1 Utah Code Ann.
§§ 75-2-501 through -513 (1978), notes
that its provisions are intended to validate
a will whenever possible. This goal is
achieved, in part, by keeping the formalities for a written and attested will to a
minimum, see section 75-2-502, and by authorizing holographic wills written and
signed by the testator:
A will which does not comply with
section 75-2-502 [requiring, among other
things, the signatures of two witnesses]
is valid as a holographic will, whether or
not witnessed, if the signature and the
material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-503 (1978) (emphasis added). As the Editorial Board Comment to section 75-2-502 makes clear, the
requisite signature need not be at the end
of a will. If the testator "writes his name
in the body of the will and intends it to be
his signature, this would satisfy the statute." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the decedent's intent is the crucial factor in determining whether a purported holographic
will has been signed within the meaning of
section 75-2-503. See In re Estate ofFegley, 42 Colo.App. 47, 589 R2d 80, 81 (1978)
(construing identical statute).

[1] The right to dispose of property by
will is governed and controlled by statute.

[2] Although the statutory requirements for execution of a valid holographic
will are minimal, the statute is mandatory
and not directory. A holographic document is invalid as a will—despite the deceased's clear intent that the document be
a will—unless the document complies with
the governing statute. In Re WolcotVs
Estate, 180 P. at 170 (decided under prior
statute requiring holographic will to be entirely written, dated, and signed by testa-

1. The issue presented in this appeal in one of
first impression in this state. Utah is one of
sixteen states to adopt all or part of the Uniform
Probate Code since 1972. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 75-1-101 to 75-8-101 (1978) (effective July
1, 1977). The others are: Alaska (1973); Arizona (1974); Colorado (1974); Florida (1975), Hawaii (1976); Idaho (1972); Kentucky (1976)

(only Art. VII, Part 1); Maine (1981); Michigan
(1979); Minnesota (1975); Montana (1975); Nebraska (1977); New Mexico (1976); North Dakota (1975); and South Carolina (1987). Due to
the recency of adoption by only a small minority of states, there is a dearth of case law construing the provisions of the Uniform Probate
Code.
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home at 1378 Blame Ave or Masaka] My Interest in
tor) See 2 Page on the Law of Wills until
she remarries, after Nevada Scratch to Go to
home shall be
Dorothy in Total
| 20.4 (W. Bowe & D. Parker ed. 1960). which the
sold + lh go to her + XU to
Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-407 REE Jr + V4 to Sheryl
(1978), proponents of wills in contested Ann Enckson My Insurance to cover my
eases always have the burden of establishinterest m the Holladay
store to go to Dorothy in
ing prima facie proof of their due execuTotal—$50,000 or more
tion, while contestants bear the burden of
other stock interests—
Some Zions Utah Bank
establishing lack of testamentary intent.
[Craft or Croft] to go To
Sheryl + Bobby Share +
See In re Estate of Olschansky, 735 P.2d
Share alike

927, 929 (1987).
The proof in support of probate must be
sufficient to convince the court that the
paper produced is the lawful will of the
testator.
A prima facie case is made when it is
shown that all the requirements of law
have been observed in the execution of
the will, and unless such prima facie case
is made the court should refuse probate
even where probate is not contested. G.
Thompson, The Law of Wills, 3rd Ed.,
§ 199.
In re Estate of Craddock, 179 Mont. 74,
586 P.2d 292, 294 (1978) (proponent failed
to establish prima facie case that purported
holographic will was written entirely by
testator, as required by statute).
Applying these principles to the instant
case, it was respondent Misaka's burden to
make a prima facie showing that the purported holographic will contained the "signature" required by section 75-2-503. On
this issue, respondent introduced only the
three unnumbered and unattached cards,
which were apparently discovered in a desk
drawer along with other belongings of decedent They read as follows, with unreadable portions indicated:
8/22/73 Last Wni + Test I
Robert E Enckson do
**reby state that I leave
*£<i bequeath to the folfewug persons of my farofy + others on my demise
I want to leave to my wife
Dorothy Enckson the

the F H Store shall go %
to Dorothy lA to REE
Jr Vi to Sheryl [unreadable] the other V< is owned
by T. Misaka The condominium at Park City s to
go To % REE Jr K to
Sheryl + fc T T [Madaka

2* The findings and conclusions entered by the
trial court, as well as the appellate briefs of both
parties, fail to distinguish "intent" for these two
different purposes. The distinction is pointed
out in Note, Wills—Validity of Signature for
Holographic Wills, 28 ArkX.Rev. 521 (1975), discussing Nelson v. Texarkana Historical Soc'y and
Museum, 257 Ark. 394, 516 S.W^d 882 (1974),
*nd Smith v. MacDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481

On the basis of these writings, respondent Misaka is claiming a one-half interest
in Erickson's Park City condominium.
Without admission of the index cards to
probate as a valid holographic will, Misaka
takes nothing; the distribution of the property is controlled by the terms of Erickson's formal 1955 will.
Although the parties and the court below
seem to have focused on the broader issue
of whether decedent intended these cards
to be a will, the relevant inquiry is whether
the evidence is sufficient to show decedent
Erickson intended that his handwritten
name near the top one of the cards be his
signature.2 Misaka offered no evidence extrinsic to the cards themselves as proof of
Erickson's intent. The trial court concluded the three index cards contained the "signature" required by section 75-2-503 for a
valid holographic will, without specifying
the particulars in the three cards relied on
to implicitly find that Erickson intended his
handwritten name to be his signature.
This determination of the decedent's intent,
based solely on the trial court's examination of the purported will, is a matter of
law, see In re Love*s Estate, 75 Utah 342,
285 P. 299 (1930), which we review on appeal under a correction-of-error standard.
Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376,
1378 (Utah 1987).
[3] In the definitions provided by the
legislature to guide construction of Utah
S.W.2d 741 (1972). In Nelson, as in this case,
the evidence extrinsic to the purported will itself
went only to the question of general testamentary intent, i.e., did the decedent intend the writing to be a will, not to whether she intended her
name in the body of the instrument to be her
signature. Nelson, 257 Ark. at 398. 516 S.VUd
at 884.
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statutes, "signature" is defined as including "any name, mark, or sign written with
the intent to authenticate any instrument
or
writing."
Utah
Code
Ann.
§ 68-3-12(2)(r) (1988). A decedent's handwritten name in the body of the purported
holographic will is not, by itself, prima
facie evidence that the document contains
the decedent's signature. In the context of
section 75-2-503, such a handwritten name
must have been written with the intent that
it operate as an authentication of the document as a will in order for it to be a
signature. The purpose of our statutory
scheme is to require a course of conduct
which assures that a person's will is reduced to writing and, when handwritten,
that the intention to have the writing take
legal effect be indicated by a signature
which records that fact. The signature
requirement shows that the writer finally
approved the writing and meant for it to be
operative as a testamentary instrument.
See Mechern, The Rule in Lemayne v.
Stanley, 29 Mich.L.Rev. 685, 690-96 (1931).
[4] Our review of the purported holographic will in this case leads us to conclude that it does not contain the signature
required by the statute before it can be
admitted to probate. The three cards in
evidence are index cards on which only the
unlined sides have been written. They
were not attached to each other. There is
no concluding language on any of the
cards, and they otherwise give no indication that they are, taken together, a completed document. Indeed, the nature of the
note cards, the use of abbreviations, lack of
punctuation, and the perfunctory, open-ended wording strongly suggest that the
cards, as a document, are unfinished or
constitute a draft.

E. Erickson do hereby state," the writing
contains nothing indicating the name was
intended as the required executing signature. There is nothing on the face of the
cards to affirmatively or by necessary implication suggest that decedent wrote his
name for any other purpose than to identify himself as the writer. See In re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal. 36, 239 P. 404
(1925); see generally, Annotation, Place of
Signature of Holographic Wills, 19 A.L.
R.2d 926, 939-44 (1951). In short, there is
no evidence that decedent's name was written in the introductory clause on one card
with the intent that it constitute authentication of one or all of the cards as a will.
Respondent, therefore, failed to make a
prima facie showing that the purported
holographic will contained the authenticating signature required by section 75-2-503.
[5] It is, of course, possible for a handwritten name at the beginning of the body
of a will to be written with the intent that
it be the requisite signature.3 However,
there must be support in the evidence for
that intent. Standing alone, it is equivocal,
leaving the decedent's final approval and
authentication of the writing in doubt.
Without more, it is an inadequate guard
against writing being deleted, a possibility
in this case if additional cards were written
upon by Erickson only to be lost, misplaced, or discarded by him or others.
The final judgment and order of the trial
court admitting the cards to probate as
decedent's holographic will is vacated.
Costs to appellant.
GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ., concur.

Although the handwritten name of the
decedent appears in the phrase "I Robert
3. Eg., Smith v. MacDonald, 252 Ark. 931, 481
S.W.2d 741 (1972) (handwritten name in title
and exordium clause constitutes signature required by statute); In re Estate of Glass, 165
Cal.App.2d 380, 331 P.2d 1045 (1958) (handwritten name in heading of document, This is
Louis R. Glass"); Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561
(Tex. 1964) (handwritten name in exordium
clause, 'That I, Roy Wheeler Bell, .../' is signature required for holographic will). But see In
re Bernard's Estate, 197 Cal. 36, 239 P. 404

(1925) (no intent that name in exordium be
signature where document terminated abruptly
after a specific bequest); Estate of Fegley, 42
Colo.App. 47, 589 P.2d 80 (1978) (phrase at end
of instrument "witness my hand ..." followed
by blank signature space indicates decedent intended to sign later and did not intend handwritten name in exordium clause to be her
signature); Davis v. Davis, 86 Okla. 255, 207 P1065 (1922) (same phrase and result as Fegley)-
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